City Council to Hold Hearings on Immigration

Led by 25th Ward Alderman Danny Solis, immigration rights activists and several aldermen announced that they will hold hearings next week to investigate claims that city and county officials allegedly violated immigrants civil rights. "We understand the value that immigrants hold in our society, whether documented or undocumented," said Solis. The allegations include charges that undocumented immigrants are being held in custody longer than the 48 hours required by law, and that city police have been pulling over Latino drivers to inquire about their immigration status. Such profiling is prohibited by a 2006 city ordinance. "This is a very serious issue," said County Commissioner Roberto Maldonado.
Last month, officials at Cook County Jail, where three federal immigration and customs officers are stationed daily, admitted that at least one immigrant inmate was detained longer than 48 hours. "We are mandated to enforce the nation's immigrations laws and we continue to aggressively do so," Immigration and Customs Enforcement spokeswoman Gail Montenegro said. "ICE is here and available to work with any law enforcement that requests assistance," adding that ICE does not racially profile, or encourage holding immigrants for longer than 48 hours."
Chicago police deny the allegations. "We do not tolerate racial profiling," said police spokeswoman Monique Bond. "We do not inquire about an individual's Immigration status."

http://chicagoist.com/2008/07/30/city_council_to_hold_hearings_on_im.php

Immigration / Asylum and Withholding from Removal / False Identity Asylum Petitions

Dhital v. Mukasey
No. 06-75043 (07/17/08)
Before Circuit Judges O’Scannlain, Hawkins, and District Judge Selna for the Central District of California http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/68063EB0FBD0A8098825748900508DA4/$file/0675043.pdf?openelement


Dhital legally entered the United States to enroll in college using a student visa. Five years later, Dhital failed to enroll full time as a student. Consequentially, immigration officials served Dhital with a notice to appear because his student visa was void.
Dhital conceded removability before an Immigration Judge (IJ), but plead for asylum, withholding from removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Additionally, Dhital produced a grant of asylum under a false identity he had obtained earlier from U.S. Immigration. The IJ denied all Dhital’s claims, and the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Ninth Circuit also affirmed. First, the Immigration and Nationality Act prohibits asylum after a frivolous application for asylum using a false identity. Second, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 requires immigrants to petition for asylum after one year of entry into the U.S. unless changed circumstances materially affected the applicant’s eligibility or extraordinary circumstances related to the delay in filing. Third, the Ninth Circuit found that an applicant must establish as more likely than not that persecution based on removal would occur for the court to grant
withholding of removal. Finally, CAT applicants must show that it is
more likely than not that they would suffer torture, not just persecution, by a particularized threat of torture with the consent of a public authority. Therefore, the IJ properly denied all of Dhital’s claims.
DENIED. Concurrence by Judge O’Scannlain.

Immigration / Application for Asylum / Denial Because of Adverse Creditability

Tekle v. Mukasey
No. 05-76841 (07/18/08)
Before Circuit Judges Noonan, Fletcher, and Bea http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/730C76BFE2C9EBA288257489007CC9E5/$file/0576841.pdf?openelement


Tekle appeals the decision of the Immigration Judge (IJ), which the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, denying her application for asylum. Tekle is a citizen of Ethiopia and an active member of the Oromo racial group that was being discriminated and mistreated in Ethiopia. Tekle testified that she was tortured during her arrest in Ethiopia and believed she would be arrested again if she were forced to return. The IJ did not believe her testimony, and the BIA affirmed, because there were slight variations in her story and her brother’s. Although the IJ found there were bad conditions in Ethiopia that the U.S. government acknowledged, Tekle’s story was not credible enough for asylum. The Ninth Circuit found that Tekle’s story was believable and the small variations were not significant enough for the IJ to discount Tekle’s need for asylum. In their analysis, the Ninth Circuit also stated the IJ based his decision on bad interpretations, not the truth, and that the IJ did not give Tekle a chance to explain the slight variations. The Ninth Circuit granted Tekle’s petition for review and remanded the case to a different IJ. GRANTED AND REMANDED.

Immigration / Aggravated Identity Theft / Knowledge that Identification Belongs to Another

United States v. Miranda-Lopez
No. 07-50123 (07/17/2008)
Before Circuit Judges Silverman, Berzon, and Bybee http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/6000AD948C9117C0882574890050B569/$file/0750123.pdf?openelement

Miranda-Lopez is a citizen of El Salvador who was previously deported from the United States. He was arrested when crossing the border using another’s resident alien card. He challenged his conviction of aggravated identity theft, claiming that knowledge that the identification belongs to another person is necessary. In addition, he claimed the district court erred in its jury instructions and in denying his Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal made a week after the jury’s verdict. The Ninth Circuit held that the statute is ambiguous as to how far Congress intended for the word "knowingly" to apply in the statute and applied the rule of lenity to find the standard of "plain error" applied to the jury instructions. There was an error, but it was not plain, as the statute was ambiguous and there is a circuit split on the issue. The district court improperly denied his Rule 29 motion on waiver grounds since Rule 29(c) expressly allows such motions within seven days of a jury verdict and does not require that the motion be made prior to jury discharge. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to reconsider his Rule 29 motion.